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Protecting Protection: First and Fifth •
Amendment Challenges to Cryptography
Regulation
Adam C. Bonint
We live in an age in which the state gradually has eroded
the right to privacy. Whether sexual practices', searches of one's
garbage bags,2 or random drug testing in high schools 3 is the
issue, courts have given the government increased freedom to
examine and explore areas of life which many believe are shielded from public scrutiny. "[A]sk anyone and they will tell you that
they have a fundamental right to privacy. They will also tell you
that privacy is under siege.""
Given this erosion of privacy, it is no surprise these issues
also exist in cyberspace. For many users of the Internet, data
encryption programs5 represent the sole means to protect their
messages from outsiders, including the government.6 Even
though the reasons why a third party, particularly the government, might take interest in reading their messages rarely are
articulated, the sentiment remains quite strong.7 If I take the

t B.A. 1994, Amherst College; J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Chicago.
Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986).
2 Californiav Greenwood, 486 US 35 (1988).
Vernonia School Districtv Acton, 115 S Ct 2386 (1995).
Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy, The Right To Privacy xiii (Knopf, 1995).
For example, in a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted in 1994 by Yankelovich
Partners, two-thirds of Americans "said it was more important to protect the privacy of
phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed
about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Who Should Keep
the Keys, Time 90 (Mar 4, 1994).
' Data encryption programs seek to hide data by using mathematical formulae to
translate plain English into a format in which only the owner of the document can read.
The technology behind encryption software is described in Part I.
' See, for example, John Perry Barlow, The Denning-Barlow Clipper Chip Debate,
http'/www.eff.org/papers/barlow-denning.html (Mar 10, 1994) ("Everytime [sic] we make
any sort of transaction in a digital environment, we smear our fingerprints all over
Cyberspace. If we are to have any privacy in the future, we will need virtual 'walls' made
of cryptography.").
Cypherpunk's Manifesto,
' See, for example,
Eric Hughes, A
httpl/weber.u.washington.edu/-phantom/cpunk/cpunk.manifesto (Mar 3, 1993) ("Privacy
in an open society also requires cryptography. If I say something, I want it heard only by
those for whom I intend it. If the content of my speech is available to the world, I have no
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extra steps to encrypt my documents, the argument goes, then
what right do others have to force me to reveal what I have
written?
There remains another story to tell. For the law enforcement
community, data encryption poses a serious threat to the ability
to detect and punish crime.8 Problems range from decrypting
child pornography files hidden on a user's hard drive to determining whether a PGP-encoded message between a military
officer and foreign contacts represents attempted espionage.9
While phone wiretaps and other current detection methods
provide the evidence in a comprehensible form, encryption technology allows comprehension to only a privileged few-those who
hold the keys. Unlike a safe which others can crack or a foreign
language which experts can translate, current encryption technology stands virtually impenetrable, allowing easy, completely
secure transfer and retention of any document. ° Indeed, rampant use of data encryption by foreign enemies could threaten
national security if our government cannot crack the codes of
foreign powers as it did during World War II.

privacy.").
8

In announcing the President's initiative to develop "Clipper Chip" technology, the

Press Secretary noted that encryption technology "helps to protect the privacy of individuals and industry, but it also can shield criminals and terrorists." Statement of the Press
Secretary, http'i/bilbo.isu.edu/security/isl/clipper.html (Apr 16, 1993).
According to FBI Director Louis Freeh, the FBI has encountered encryption technology being used by child pornographers and Filipino terrorists who planned the
assasination of Pope John Paul II. In addition, Professor Dorothy Denning of Georgetown
University has surveyed law enforcement agencies regarding the use of encryption technology in furthering crimes: "'I came up with over 20 cases-child pornography, terrorism,
murder, embezzlement, fraud, tax protestors, export violations-and, in some cases, they
were able to crack it,and others they couldn't.'" Peter H. Lewis, The FBI Sting Operation
on Child PornographyRaises Questions About Encryption, New York Times D5 (Sept. 25,
1995).
"o James K. Kallstrom, who is an FBI Special Agent stated:
The essence of the cryptographic threat is that high-grade and user-friendly encryption products can seriously hinder law enforcement and counterintelligence
agencies in their ability to conduct electronic surveillance that is often necessary
to carrying out their statutorily-based missions and responsibilities.... Realtime decryption is often essential so that law enforcement can rapidly respond
to criminal activity and, in many instances, prevent serious and life-threatening
criminal acts.
Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation of the House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, 103rd Cong, 2d Sess 25 (1994).
" See John Keegan, The Second World War 496-502 (Penguin, 1989).
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This Comment begins with background information on the
nature of cryptography and an explanation of how modern publickey cryptography software functions. It surveys the state of the
law regarding cryptography and current restrictions on the
export of cryptographic software. It then considers the question of
cryptography and the First Amendment. This Comment then
argues that encrypted documents represent a form of speech, and
as such, should receive protection by the First Amendment from
a ban on their use. Precedent suggests that the courts will not
accept "national security" or "the needs of law enforcement" as
sufficient justifications to ban innocent cryptography usage.2
Given that the government cannot ban cryptography, this
Comment finally argues that the Fifth Amendment precludes the
government's ability to coerce individuals to decrypt their documents. As long as users memorize their passwords and do not
commit them to paper, the government will prove unable to force
them to decrypt their documents. The Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination acts as a shield against such attempts.
I. ENCRYPTION AND THE INTERNET

As legend has it, cryptography started with Julius Caesar.
Not trusting his messengers to keep his missives private, he
shifted every letter in a document a fixed amount, for example
turning A's into D's, B's into E's, and so forth. Only those whom
Caesar entrusted with the knowledge of the rotation scheme
could understand his messages, allowing him to send detailed
military directives to the front in confidence. Since that time,
governments and private citizens have turned to increasingly
complex means of recording information, using mathematical
formulae generated by computers. These programs, far more
elaborate than the Caesarian rotation system, can assure the
sender that only the intended recipient can decipher the document and read its contents."'
Public-key encryption overcomes the inherent difficulty in
other encryption schemes. Prior methods required the sender to
first transmit the encryption scheme through nonsecure channels
so that the recipient would know how to decrypt the actual documents. The old system remained inherently flawed because com12

See Part III.B.2.

This story and others, including the development of cryptography in America by
such people as Thomas Jefferson, can be found on the Internet. See Cryptography
Timeline, http'/www.clark.net/pub/cme/html/timeline.html (June 2, 1996).
"
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munications could not begin without first risking the safety of
the code as the deciphering mechanism itself could not be sent
encrypted. In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published a paper titled New Directions in Cryptography, outlining
how a concept called "public key" encryption could overcome the
difficulty."'
A public-key system generates two related password keys,
one "public" and one "private"; each key consists of a randomly
generated string of alphanumeric characters. 5 The user makes
her public key known to those who want to send her secure messages. Those people use that key to encrypt messages sent to her.
To decrypt those messages requires the use of the private key,
which only the owner possesses." Complete strangers can use
public-key encryption systems with the assurance that their
messages remain confidential. Currently, there exists no verified
way to determine the private decoding key by looking at the
public encoding key. 7
On the Internet, a public-key encryption program called
Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP") has become the de facto standard. 8

14

Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, IT-22

IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 644 (1976).
" For example, this is the PGP public key of Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont:
--BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE
--Version:
2.6.2
iQCVAwUBMYjdVBM5YGSLu9/lAQGFwwQArk/HYG65cSOr3dsykvkDFonjISju
r7xbSEMCFLI3E4KSoXSy4 6cNogICGADxDnwI8j/29Gviu d93eQ2veeNmKP43
rOR Zcv86b3/pK6btq3QqVN6 x3G8CEA2MnDtuSWbNyANEdValtpOYTCzU2Sm
6gNfg9Q 4QxUZ4R4 Ps= =VJ87
-END
PGP SIGNATURESenator Leahy published his key as an attachment to a letter sent out on behalf of procryptography legislation he was sponsoring. See Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
on Encryption, http:/www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Key-escrow/Cryptobills_1996/
leahypgp960502_net.letter (May 2, 1996).
16 One analogy might be as follows: If I want people to call me on the telephone, I
give them my phone number, and those digits must be entered before someone can call
me. At the same time, I am the only one posessing the phone equipment that can answer
a call placed to that number. In order to listen to my phone calls, one needs to break into
my house or tap into the line before the communication enters my house. A good public
key system constructs an impenetrable fortress on both fronts.
1
From the PGP Frequently Asked Questions With Answers 1.3, http:J/www.cis.ohiostate.edu/hypertext/faq/usenetlpgp-faq/partl/faq.html (June 22, 1995).
"' Steven Levy, The Cypherpunks vs. Uncle Sam, New York Times Magazine 44, 60
(June 12, 1994). PGP is based on the RSA mathematical encryption formula, which works
as follows:
1. Find P and Q, two large (e.g., 1024-bit) prime numbers.
2. Choose E such that E and (P-1)(Q-1) are relatively prime, which means they
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Because of the relative ease of use of its interface, many in the
Internet community consider PGP to offer a radically democratizing tool, allowing all citizens to have a level of privacy previously
enjoyed by an elite few.19 Encryption technology thus could upset the balance between the state and the individual and make it
impossible for law enforcement agencies to conduct investigations
in cyberspace. According to Phil Zimmerman, author of Pretty
Good Privacy:
If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy.
Intelligence agencies have access to good cryptographic
technology. So do the big arms and drug traffickers. So
do defense contractors, oil companies, and other corporate giants. But ordinary people and grassroots political
organizations mostly have not had access to affordable
military grade public-key cryptographic technology.
Until now. PGP empowers people to take their privacy
into their own hands. There's a growing social need for
it. That's why I wrote it.20
A recently published scientific paper has raised the first
doubts about the impenetrability of public-key systems. 1
have no prime factors in common. E does not have to be prime, but it must be
odd..(P-1)(Q-1) can't be prime because it's an even number.
3. Compute D such that (DE-1) is evenly divisible by (P-1)(Q-1). Mathematicians
write this as DE = 1 mod (P-1)(Q-1), and they call D the multiplicativeinverse of
E.
4. The encryption function is encrypt(T) = (T^E) mod PQ, where T is the
plaintext (a positive integer) and "^" indicates exponentiation.
5. The decryption function is decrypt(C) = (CAD) mod PQ, where C is the
ciphertext (a positive integer) and "A" indicates exponentiation.
Your public key is the pair (PQ, E). Your private key is the number D (reveal it
to no one). The product PQ is the modulus. E is the public exponent. D is the
secret exponent.
You can publish your public key freely, because there are no known easy methods of calculating D, P, or Q given only (PQ, E) (your public key). If P and Q are
each 1024 bits long, the sun will burn out before the most powerful computers
presently in existence can factor your modulus into P and Q.
The Mathematical Guts of RSA
Encryption, http://www.ai-lab.fhfurtwangen.de/~dziadzkaNortraege/Cryptography/the-mathematical_guts of_rsaencrypt
ion.html. There are no export restrictions on publishing the mathematical formulae; only
the dissemination of means of implementation are barred. For a description of how PGP
works as a user interface see EFH Pretty Good Privacy Workshop,
httpJ/www.efh.org/pgp/pgpwork.html#ufriend (Jan 14, 1995).
" Phil
Zimmerman,
Why
Do You
Need
PGP?,
http'J/www.math.ucla.edu/pgp/volumelIWhyDoYouNeedPGP.html (Sept 8, 1994).
20

Id.

21

Paul C. Kocher, Cryptanalysisof Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
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Cryptanalyst Paul Kocher explained that attackers could use
outside measurements of the time used to complete cryptographic
operations to determine how the keys are generated. With that
information, a skilled hacker could have an easier time determining the keys themselves.2 While not yet attempted in practice,

Kocher's theory of using timing attacks presents the first substantial challenge to the reliability of PGP."3
II. THE LAW'S TREATMENT OF ENCRYPTION
According to the United States Government, Phil
Zimmerman, designer of PGP and a winner of a Chrysler Innovation in Design Award, may also be an arms trafficker and international munitions dealer. Under the Arms Export Control Act 24
and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"),25
cryptographic software represents a dangerous munition which
people cannot export from the United States. Because
Zimmerman placed PGP on the Internet for public access and
downloading, one could argue that he knowingly allowed its export around the world in violation of the Act. The government
convened a grand jury against Zimmerman to determine whether
he violated ITAR. On January 11, 1996, the government announced that it would not file charges against Zimmerman, but
made no statement whether others might suffer under ITAR in
the future.26

Using Timing Attacks, http//www.cryptography.com (Dec 7, 1995). One hint of the importance of Kocher's work is the fact that the New York Times ran a front-page article of
Kocher's work after his abstract was first released. John Markoff, Secure Digital Transactions Just Got a Little Less Secure, New York Times Ai (Dec 11, 1995).
22 Markoff, New York Times at Ai (cited in note 21).
23 Id. The security of PGP is premised on the notion that outsiders cannot determine
the prime numbers used in its key generation. A successful timing attack would give the
potential code cracker a good start in determining how they were generated, thus reducing the search for the keys to a more manageable size.
Even if timing attacks can be used to foil PGP, there will doubtless be conceived
other cryptographic methods immune to timing attacks whose decryption would require
the owner to reveal the password. As such, neither Kocher's article nor other challenges to
PGP moot the analytical thrust of this Comment.
14 22 USC § 2778 (1996).
22 22 CFR § 121.1, Category XIII(b)(1) (1995).
26 Elizabeth Corcoran, U.S. Closes Investigation In Computer Privacy Case, Washington Post All (Jan 12, 1996). Word spread quickly on Usenet discussion groups such as
alt.security.pgp and talk.politics.crypto when the announcement was made, including an
acknowledgement of thanks by Zimmerman himself. A copy of the Justice Department's
press release may be found on the World-Wide Web on the home page for the Center for
Democracy and Technology, a computer civil-liberties organization. See
http"/www.cdt.org/crypto/zimm_ 1_11-pr.html.

495]

CHALLENGES TO CRYPTOGRAPHY REGULATION

501

The Arms Export Control Act empowers the President, with
the advice of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, to designate as nonexportable those items which would
"contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of
mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the
possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the
development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements." 7 The United
States Munitions List 8 , which lists all devices and material
prohibited from export, bans cryptographic methods by which
users secure data.2 9
The inclusion of cryptographic software on the United States
Munitions List is not subject to judicial review. In United States
0 producers challenged
v Martinez,"
the placement of video
descrambling units on the list. These units were classified under
the same Category XIII(b) list of data-altering devices as cryptographic software. Judge Roney, writing for the court, held that
the courts had no standing to adjudicate the issue. The "political
question" doctrine governed these decisions, and only the more
democratically responsive branches of government could make
these determinations:
The consequences of uninformed judicial action could be
grave. Questions concerning what perils our nation
might face at some future time and how best to guard
against those perils "are delicate, complex, and involve

2
2'

22 USC § 2778(a)(2) (1995).
22 CFR § 121.1 (1995).
The relevant section includes:

Information Security Systems and equipment, cryptographic devices, software,
and components specifically designed or modified therefore, including:
(1) Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, integrated circuits, components or software with the capability of
maintaining secrecy or confidentiality of information or information systems, except cryptographic equipment and software as follows:
(i) Restricted to decryption functions specifically designed to allow the
execution of copy protected software, provided the decryption functions are not
user-accessible.
(ii) Specially designed, developed or modified for use in machines for banking or money transactions, and restricted to use only in such transactions. Machines for banking or money transactions include automatic teller machines ....
22 CFR § 121.1, Category XIII(b) (1995).
904 F2d 601 (11th Cir 1990).
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large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political power not
subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry."3
Regardless of any restrictions on the export of encryption
software, PGP and similar software have quickly reached across
the world via the Internet and the World-Wide Web.3" Even if
one erased all the copies currently extant, both foreign and domestic cryptographers could replicate the software algorithms or
create good facsimiles fairly quickly. The aphorism that national
borders have been mere speed bumps on the information superhighway33 seems true; once in cyberspace, encryption technology
spreads uncontrollably.
III. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS UPON POTENTIAL ENCRYPTION
REGULATION

A.

Technology Has Outpaced Law Enforcement And Regulating
The Strength of Encryption Technology Would Prove Unwise

Data encryption by private citizens would not present an
obstacle for the government if it could access the "plaintext" of
communications without the owner's assistance or knowledge.34
Few safes owned by private citizens remain so secure that the
government cannot forcibly open them when necessary. No outsider, however, can "crack open" documents encrypted with the
3 Id at 602. To see other cases in which the courts passed judgment on controversies
deemed "political questions," see Dalton v Specter, 114 S Ct 1719, 1721 (1994) (refusing to
review decision by President Clinton to close the Philadelphia Naval Yard upon challenge
by United States Senator Arlen Specter); and Nixon v United States, 506 US 224 (1993)
(refusing to review Senate procedures during impeachment of District Court Judge Walter
Nixon).
" Zimmerman has received word that PGP was being taught to refuseniks in the
former Soviet Union and Burmese freedom fighters in jungle training camps using laptop
computers. According to one letter he received from Latvia, "'Let it never be, but if dictatorship takes over Russia, your PGP is widespread from Baltic to Far East now and will
help democratic people if necessary.'" Steven Levy, The Cypherpunks vs. Uncle Sam, New
York Times Magazine 44, 60 (June 12, 1994) (cited in note 18).
' Timothy May, former Intel physicist and co-founder 'of the "cypherpunk" movement, confirms that he originated this expression (e-mail on file with University of Chicago Legal Forum).
" By "plaintext," I refer to the original document created by the user, able to be read
by other individuals. The encrypted document can be referred to as "ciphertext."
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software currently used by computer users. Modern technology
now offers citizens the ability to communicate and interact with
privacy and security, unlike telephonic communications which
the government may legally wiretap.35
Two constraints, technological and constitutional, force the
resolution of the issue. For the purposes of this paper, the technological constraint is assumed: government computers and
cryptanalysts lack the technical knowledge and capacity to
decrypt documents encoded with public-key cryptography.
Kocher's theory of timing attacks has yet to be implemented.3" A
1024-bit code (equivalent to 64 characters) would require 2024
keys to be tested in a brute-force attack.37 A computer processing one million keys per second would take approximately 8.96
times 1027 years to complete. The universe is only around 1010
years old, by comparison."
In order to disable encryption software's potentially perilous
consequences, the government has begun to explore regulations
beyond the export ban. Treating cryptographic enablers as dangerous devices similar to explosives, the government could seek
to obviate the problems cryptography poses by refusing to allow
threatening forms to proliferate domestically.39 Regulatory options include restrictions on the potency of cryptography
available to the public and mandatory key escrow schemes, like
the Clinton administration's early Clipper Chip proposal. °

Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438 (1928).
John Markoff, Secure Digital TransactionsJust Got a Little Less Secure, New York
Times Al (Dec 11, 1995) (cited in note 21).
"' A "brute-force" attack is what the name implies: using every possible combination
of keys to try to crack the code.
' See Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip
and the Constitution, 143 U Pa L Rev 709, 887 (1995).
3' By maintaining the export ban on cryptographic software generating keys of
greater than 40 bits, the federal government presently seeks to deter the development for
domestic use of commercial cryptographic software containing stronger protection. This is
because the export ban forces U.S. software manufacturers to produce two versions of
software with encrypting capabilities, one of full strength for the domestic market and one
for export with much weaker capacities. Export Controls on Mass Market Software,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong, 1st Sess 44-47 (1993) (statement of Ray
Ozzie, President of Iris Associates, on behalf of the Business Software Alliance).
'0 Under a mandatory key escrow scheme like the Clipper Chip, the government
would only allow individuals to use encrypting technologies which provide the government
with a "back door" key which can be entered with a valid search warrant. The implications of the Clipper Chip have already been discussed extensively in legal scholarship. See
Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 752-62 (cited in note 38). See also Comment, The Fourth
Amendment's Prohibitionson Encryption Limitations, 58 Albany L Rev 467, 502-04 (1995);
Ilene Knable Gotts and Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global Information Superhigh'5
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We must'take the "device" analogy seriously because the
government itself currently views cryptography as a device as
well as a dangerous munition.41 As such, the government might
consider regulation of cryptographic software in the same manner
that it considers regulation of other munitions. The Second
Amendment is not implicated when the federal government decides to ban certain types of guns or bullets because of their
potency; instead, it allows reasonable restrictions on uses which
endanger the safety of law-enforcement officials and the general
public.4 2 The same could occur with cryptography; the government could limit the bit length of keys to restrict them to lengths
which the government could decrypt if necessary.4 3
A regulation on the sophistication of cryptographic software
seems unlikely to prove effective. Restricting the use of cryptography to more easily decryptable forms defeats the purpose of
encrypting data. If the government can decrypt an individual's
code, so too could any enterprising private citizens with a background in cryptography. Those users most concerned with the
security of their documents, including those who believe they
have incriminating information to hide, likely would continue to
use encrypting devices with the highest possible security. In
addition, cryptographic software does not constitute a "thing"
which people can detect and destroy like a forbidden bullet. It is
a form of information which users can create, duplicate, and
transmit worldwide with greater ease than any tangible asset.
The government will have great difficulty stopping the spread of
cryptographic software given the ease of international distribution via the Internet.

way, 8 Harv J L & Tech 275, 332-36 (1995); Comment, The Clipper Chip: How Key Escrow
Threatens to Undermine the Fourth Amendment, 25 Seton Hall L Rev 1142, 1165-75
(1995); Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L J 1743, 1751 n 23 (1995).
" 22 CFR § 121.1, Category XIII(b) (1995).
42 The same argument was used in Congress to ban the use of certain types of bullets
which can pierce otherwise "bulletproof" vests. See 18 USC § 922(a)(7)-(8) (1995) (banning
the manufacture, import, sale or delivery of "armor piercing ammunition"). In signing the
bill, President Reagan noted that " ... [Clertain forms of ammunition have no legitimate
sporting, recreational, or self-defense use and thus should be prohibited." Ronald Reagan,
Regulation of Armor-Piercing Ammunition, 22 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1130 (Aug 28, 1986). See also .18 USC § 929(a)(1) (1995) (increasing the penalty by
at least five years for the use of armor piercing ammunition in drug trafficking offenses).
" At the same time, licensing and registration of keys could also be mandated, just
like with guns. This is the essence of the "Clipper Chip" proposal. See note 40.
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B. A Ban On Cryptography Would Violate the First Amendment
1. Cryptographyis a form of speech.
The government could choose to ban all computer-generated
encryption under a "national security" or "needs of law enforcement" justification. Professor Michael Froomkin compares this
approach to the "Al Capone" prosecution for tax evasion: if a user
will not voluntarily decrypt potentially incriminating evidence for
the government, she could still face prosecution for the lesser
crime of using illegal cryptography." The First Amendment provides the initial challenge to such a scheme. We should consider
whether cryptography is a form of speech. If it is a form of
speech, then on what the grounds can the government ban it?
Cryptographic communications (i.e., the documents themselves) should be treated legally as a form of speech. An encrypted document resembles an unknown foreign language in many
ways: it consists of alphanumeric characters and exists for no
other reason than to express something to others. On the other
hand, in its encrypted form it possesses none of the traits we
typically associate with speech. The dictionary provides one definition of speech: "the communication or expression of thoughts in
spoken words."' The receiver of the encrypted communication
cannot comprehend it in this form, requiring the use of a mechanical aid for translation. Because it is wholly incomprehensible in that state, some argue that we should not consider it to be
speech."
Professor Froomkin, however, reminds us that these Internet
communications do not differ from telephonic communications.47
When one talks on the phone, speech travels through a device
which translates it into another form-electric pulses or a fiberoptic signal. The signal itself remains indecipherable to the person at the other end of the line. The courts, however, have consistently seen these communications as forms of expression protected by the First Amendment to the same extent as other oral
forms." For example, in Sable Communications of California,

Inc. v FCC.49 the Supreme Court struck down certain indecencyFroomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 881 n 756 (cited in note 38).
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1133 (Merriam-Webster, 1986).
4' See Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 867 (cited in note 38).
Id at 869-70.
See, for example, Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v FCC, 114 S Ct 2445, 2456
(1994) (cable television as speech); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC, 492
US 115 (1989) (telephone communications).
49 492 US 115 (1989).
"

'
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based restrictions on telephone communications as overbroad
restrictions of free speech. Encrypted documents also exist as a
means of communicating thoughts and ideas through a particular
medium, and we can safely treat them as speech in examining
the legality of encryption.
In the only case to address these issues so far, a district
court judge ruled that cryptographic computer source code was
speech.50 Cryptographic source code is the set of instructions
which becomes translated into a computer-readable form in order
to generate encrypted documents. 5 ' The Bernstein case
challenged ITAR restrictions on the export of cryptographic software on their face.52 In a preliminary order, Judge Patel ruled
that source code was speech for First Amendment purposes. "The
music inscribed in code on the roll of a player piano is no less
protected for being wholly functional. Like source code converted
to object code, it 'communicates' to and directs the instrument
itself, rather than the musician,
to produce the music. That does
53
not mean it is not speech."
1. Encryption is protected by the First Amendment and
cannot be barred under a "nationalsecurity" or "needs of
law enforcement"justification.
In the interests of law enforcement, the government could
issue a total ban on the use of encryption by private citizens.
This would not represent the first time that the federal government has attempted such wide-ranging regulation. As part of the
Office of Censorship's activities during World War II, the government banned the use of unauthorized codes, ciphers, and secret
inks.54 In addition, Americans could only write letters in English, French, Portuguese, or Spanish; the use of any other lan-

50 Bernstein v United States Department of State, 922 F Supp 1426, 1436 (ND Cal
1996).
5 Id at 1436. While Bernstein involved source and object code, its analysis is equally
applicable to the question of encrypted documents. Judge Patel explained that a language
is "a complex system of understood meanings within specific communities" even when
that community is between a person and her computer. As with the encrypted documents
themselves, object code carries meaning which is comprehensible only after being processed by a computer. Nevertheless, Bernstein finds it to be speech: "[Tihe functionality of
a language does not make it any less like speech." Id at 1435.
52 Id at 1428. This opinion represents the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of justiciability. There has yet to be a ruling on the merits. Id.
Id at 1435.
32 CFR § 1801.22 (1945).

495]

CHALLENGES TO CRYPTOGRAPHY REGULATION

507

guage was forbidden."5 Similar rules permitted only specified
languages on certain telephone calls. 8
It seems highly unlikely that the courts would sustain peacetime restrictions on the languages or modes of communications
for telephones and e-mail on First Amendment and equal protection grounds. 7 Professor Geoffrey Stone, in examining the Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutionality of content-neutral
laws which sought to ban particular forms of expression, 8 determined that such regulations generally were subject to intermediate scrutiny.59 In such a test, the Court considers factors such as
the substantiality of the government interest, the extent to which
the restriction furthers that interest, and the availability of less
restrictive alternatives." In order to pass the substantiality test,
the government cannot merely demonstrate that less restrictive
measures would serve its ends less effectively. Rather, writes
Stone, ". . . [t]he government must prove that its use of a less
restrictive alternative would seriously undermine substantial
government interests."6 Stone notes that the government often,
though not always, loses under this test."
A ban on encryption probably will not survive an intermediate-scrutiny test based on a "needs of law enforcement" justification. In City of Houston v Hill,63 the Supreme Court overturned
a local ordinance that criminalized conduct for "willfully or intentionally interrupt[ing] a city policeman... by verbal challenge
during an investigation."" The Court held that the ordinance
constituted an overbroad abridgment of free speech by
criminalizing a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct regardless of whatever legitimate applications the ordinance might have.6 5 Because a ban on all cryptography usage
would criminalize speech bearing no criminal element whatsoever, the Court likely will not uphold it. This would provide the
'5 32 CFR § 1801.48 (1945). The section also banned the use of "any word, term,
phraseology or language having a double meaning."
56 32 CFR § 1801.74 (1945).
17 Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 865-66 (cited in note
38).
' The list included such things as leafletting, door-to-door solicitation, and street
demonstrations. Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46, 64
(1987).
59 Id.
oId at 52.
61

Id at 53.

'

Stone, 54 U Chi L Rev at 53 (cited in note 58).

63

482 US 451 (1987).
Id at 454.
Id at 460-67.
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same benefits to law enforcement and investigation as banning
doors on private houses and will likely be viewed as unconscionable by the courts.6"
The Court probably will refuse to uphold such restrictions on
the grounds of national security. In United States v Robel,67 the
Court struck down a section of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 195068 as an unconstitutional abridgment of protected
First Amendment activities despite the proferred "national security" justification. The case concerns Cold War restrictions on the
employment of Communists at defense facilities. Writing in
strong language for the Court, Chief Justice Warren argued: "...
this concept of 'national defense' cannot be deemed an end in
itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to
promote such a goal. Implicit in the term 'national defense' is the
notion of defending those values and ideals which set this Nation
apart."69 Even national security justifications had to receive protection by the "less drastic" means.7 ° As a sweeping ban on all
cryptography would have similarly drastic results, such overreaching action appears unlikely to survive such a test.

6 This is not to say, however, that a narrowly tailored statute to increase the penalty
for those crimes in which cryptography is used in an effort to hinder investigations might
be acceptable. This would be akin to 18 USC § 924(c)(1) (1995), which increases the penalty by five years for the use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence or drug trafficking, with longer penalties for semiautomatic and other more
potent firearms.
67

71

389 US 258 (1967).

50 USC § 784(a)(1)(D).
Robel, 389 US at 264.
Id at 268. Explaining the test, Chief Justice Warren wrote:

Faced with a clear conflict between a federal statute enacted in the interests of
national security and an individual's exercise of his First Amendment rights, we
have confined our analysis to whether Congress has adopted a constitutional
means in achieving its concededly legitimate legislative goal. In making this
determination we have found it necessary to measure the validity of the means
adopted by Congress against both the goal it has sought to achieve and the
specific prohibitions of the First Amendment. But we have in no way "balanced"
those respective interests ....Such a course of adjudication was enunciated by
Chief Justice Marshall when he declared: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added). In this case, the means chosen
by Congress are con&ary to the "letter and spirit" of the First Amendment.
Id at 268 n 20.
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The Fifth Amendment And Key Escrow

C.

1. The current state of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
Even if the use of cryptography remains protected, it poses
little threat to law enforcement so long as authorities can obtain
copies of the "plaintext" desired. The question becomes whether
law enforcement agencies could compel users to decrypt their
documents and produce plaintext upon the presentation of a valid
search warrant or subpoena. Law enforcement officials would not
regard cryptography as -a threat nor desire a total ban on its use
if they could crack the codes when necessary. This capability
would give officials access to those documents seized from
suspects' hard drives and UNIX accounts. This would not offer a
total solution, for it would not eliminate the problem of
decrypting documents which authorities obtain surreptitiously by
entering user accounts, wiretapping, and enlisting other means to
circumvent the owner of the documents. The Fifth Amendment,
however, protects individuals from self-incrimination and stands
as a substantial bar for the government to clear.
The Self-Incrimination clause reads: "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... 7 1 As currently interpreted, the Fifth Amendment prevents an individual from "being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial
or communicative nature." 2 At the same time, a criminal susbe compelled to produce certain "real or physical evipect can
73
dence."
The privilege against self-incrimination has deep historical
roots.74 In Holt v United States,75 Justice Holmes asserted that
the privilege did not bar all attempts to gain evidence from the
accused. "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material."76

"

US Const, Amend V.

72 Schmerber v California,384 US 757, 761 (1966).
13

Id at

764.

7' For a detailed, informative view of the historical roots of the -privilege, see R.H.

Hehnholz, Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European
Ius Commune, 65 NYU L Rev 962 (1990).
75 218 US 245 (1910).
76 Id at 252-53.
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Holmes thus saw no problem in compelling the defendant to wear
a blouse in order to prove that it fit his body.77
78
The Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v California
established the framework for modern-day self-incrimination
analysis. "It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches
an accused's communications, whatever form they might take,
and the compulsion of responses which are also communications,
for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers."79 To receive the protection of the privilege, the act must
communicate something substantive about the accused; the Fifth
Amendment does not protect "acts noncommunicative in nature
as to the person asserting the privilege." ° The Court reasoned
that a compelled blood test did not violate the privilege since the
defendant participated simply as a donor and was not required to
communicate anything regarding his guilt. Anything incriminating came from the state's chemical analysis of the extracted sample, not from any direct communication by the accused."'
Similarly, the Fifth Amendment does not provide an absolute
bar to the compelled production of documents by the accused.82
In Curcio v United States, 3 the Court indicated that the government could compel production of corporate documents. Forcing an
individual to reveal even the mere location of documents, however, violates the privilege by compelling him to communicate evidence which may be incriminating. "[F]orcing the custodian to
testify orally as to the whereabouts of nonproduced records requires him to disclose the contents of his own mind. He might be

77

Id.

384 US 757.
Id at 763-64 (citing Boyd v United States, 116 US 616 (1885)).
8'Id at 761 n 5. The Schmerber court used "testimonial" and "communicative" as
synonyms in trying to explain the test:
78

71

But the Fifth Amendment relates only to acts on the part of the person to whom
the privilege applies, and we use these words subject to the same limitations. A
nod or head-shake is as much a "testimonial" or "communicative" act in this
sense as are spoken words. But the terms as we use them do not apply to evidence of acts noncommunicative in nature as to the person asserting the privilege, even though, as here, such acts are compelled to obtain the testimony of
others.
Id.

" Id at 765.
82 United States v Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975).
354 US 118 (1957).
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compelled to convict himself out of his own mouth. That is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment."4
In United States v Nobles,85 the Court reviewed some of the
limits of the privilege's protection. In order to receive protection,
the testimony sought from the accused must include incriminating information. The privilege remains personal to the defendant
and does not extend to third parties relating incriminating information.86 Moreover, not all compelled communications incriminate. "The purpose of the relevant part of the Fifth Amendment
is to prevent compelled self-incrimination, not to protect private
information. Testimony demanded of a witness may be very private indeed, but unless it is incriminating and protected by the
Amendment or unless protected by one of the evidentiary privileges, it must be disclosed."87
In Fisher v United States,ss the Court explained further how
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only
provides a limited shield for criminal defendants, leaving unprotected those documents which do not incriminate. "It is also clear
that the Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the
compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial
communication which is incriminating."89
Witnesses stand protected, however, from compulsion to
"restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought."9" If the government already knows of the existence and location of the documents and can prove independently
their connection to the accused, he does not incriminate himself
by producing those documents. Rather, the documents themselves, not the defendant, incriminate. The defendant only has
protection from communicating personal guilt. In her concurrence
in a subsequent case, Justice O'Connor curtly summarized the
prevailing view of the Fisher holding: "[T]he Fifth Amendment
provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind."91

s Id at 128.
422 US 225 (1975).
Id at 233.
17 Id at 233 n 7 (quoting Maness v Meyers, 419 US 449, 473-74
(1975) (White concurring in judgment)).

88

425 US 391 (1976).
Id at 408.
Id at 409.

"

United States v Doe, 465 US 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor concurring).
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Even when the document itself receives no protection, however, the act of document production can become a form of incriminating testimony protected by the Fifth Amendment.92 In United
States v Doe, the Court held that the compelled production of
certain business records, under the circumstances, constituted a
testimonial act covered by the privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, the Supreme Court declined to upset the finding of the District Court that "enforcement of the subpoenas
would compel [respondent] to admit that the records exist, that
they are in his possession, and that they are authentic."9 3 The
government failed to show that it otherwise could prove the
documents' existence, possession, and authenticity with relation
to their alleged owner.94
In a different case, Doe v United States,95 the question arose
concerning the compelled delivery of bank records through a
consent decree. During an investigation for suspected fraud and
receipt of unreported income, federal investigators subpoenaed
Doe's bank records from the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Only
Doe's signature could release the records.9 6 Doe argued that
signing a consent decree to have the records released would make
it a compelled testimonial communication protected by the Fifth
Amendment.97
Realizing that the release form could become testimonial, the
Government drafted the decree to avoid forcing the defendant to
admit ownership of the records or vouch for their authenticity. 98
For that reason, the Court held that the decree did not constitute
a testimonial communication.9 9 The Court reiterated its test
that" . . . in order to be testimonial, an accused's communication
must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or
disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a
'witness' against himself.""' Only examining the facts and cir-

92

Id.

" Id at 613 n 11 (quoting the lower court's opinion in In re Grand Jury Empanelled
March 19, 1980, 541 F Supp 1, 3 (1981)).
"9 Id at 613 n 12.

9' Doe v United States, 487 US 201 (1988).
96

Id at 202-3.

Id at 205-6.
The consent form did not name specific banks; instead, the defendant was to
command "any bank or trust company at which I may have a bank account of any
kind ... to disclose all information and deliver copies of all documents of every nature in
your possession or control which relate to said bank account .... ." Id at 204 n 2, 205.
Doe, 487 F2d at 219.
Id at 210.
97
98
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cumstances of the particular case, rather than by the articulation
of narrow rules, answers this question." 1
Justice Stevens, dissenting in the second Doe case, adopted
an analogy that seems apt to the cryptography debate.0 2
Stevens listed the various items which a court could force a defendant to produce, including fingerprints, blood samples, and
handwriting specimens. He then stated:
But can he be compelled to use his mind to assist the
prosecution in convicting him of a crime? I think not.
He may in some cases be forced to surrender a key to a
strongbox containing incriminating documents, but I do
not believe he can be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe-by word or by deed.' 3
The majority (in dicta) agreed with Stevens's assessment of
the distinction but disagreed with his conclusions. According to
the majority, where people keep information presents a crucial
distinction. "We do not disagree with the dissent that '[t]he expression of the contents of an individual's mind' is testimonial
communication for purposes of the Fifth Amendment."'' 4 This
would appear to establish a clear test for Fifth Amendment analysis of encryption codes: does the key to a PGP-encrypted document more closely resemble the key to a strongbox or the combination to a safe?
Most recently, the Court asserted in Pennsylvania v
Muniz °5 that a de minimus test for whether compelled evidence is testimonial, and thus protected by the privilege, arises
when the accused faces what Justice Brennan called the "cruel
trilemma."' ° If the only possible responses to a question are
"self-accusation, perjury or contempt,"'0 ° the accused receives
the privilege's protection. According to Brennan: "[W]henever a.
suspect is asked for a response requiring him to communicate an
express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity or silence, and hence the

"' Id at 214-15 (citing Fisher,425 US at 410).
102 Id at 219 (Stevens dissenting).
"
04

Doe, 487 US at 219 (Stevens dissenting).

Id at 210 n 9.

'05496 US 582 (1990).
0 Id at 597.
07 Id at 595 n 8 (quoting Murphy v Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378
US 52, 55 (1964)).
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response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial component." l"'
2.

The Fifth Amendment protects users of encryption
software from being forced to reveal their private keys.
The courts likely will find that compelling someone to reveal
the steps necessary to decrypt a PGP-encrypted document violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination. Because most users protect their private keys by
memorizing passwords to them and not writing them down, access to encrypted documents would almost definitely require an
individual to disclose the contents of his mind.10 9 This bars the
state from compelling its production. This would force law enforcement officials to grant some form of immunity to the owners
of these documents to gain access to them.
Encryption software is designed to protect a user's privacy
and privilege against self-incrimination. In order to protect the
private key on the hard drive, PGP asks the user to enter a pass
phrase of up to 128 characters.1 10 An algorithm called MD5
encrypts the pass phrase onto the hard drive.' The user must

'8 Id at 597.
"o If the user has written down her password, law enforcement agencies will be able
to obtain it via search warrants, subpoenas, and the like.
1o Users are urged to make the pass phrase as complex as possible, while still being
able to commit it to memory:

All of the security that is available in PGP can be made absolutely useless if you
don't choose a good pass phrase to encrypt your secret key ring. Too many people use their birthday, their telephone number, the name of a loved one, or some
easy to guess common word. While there are a number of suggestions for generating good pass phrases, the ultimate in security is obtained when the characters of the pass phrase are chosen completely at random. It may be a little harder to remember, but the added security is worth it. As an absolute minimum
pass phrase, I would suggest a random combination of at least 8 letters and
digits, with 12 being a better choice. With a 12 character pass phrase made up
of the lower case letters a-z plus the digits 0-9, you have about 62 bits of key,
which is 6 bits better than the 56 bit DES keys. If you wish, you can mix upper
and lower case letters in your pass phrase to cut down the number of characters
that are required to achieve the same level of security. I don't do this myself
because I hate having to manipulate the shift key while entering a pass phrase.
A pass phrase which is composed of ordinary words without punctuation or
special characters is susceptible to a dictionary attack. Transposing characters
or misspelling words makes your pass phrase less vulnerable, but a professional
dictionary attack will cater for this sort of thing.
PGP FAQ,
§ 3.11. How do I choose a pass
http'J/www.quadralay.com/www/Crypt/PGP/pgp03.html#311.
.. Paul Elliot,
EFH Pretty
Good Privacy

phrase?,
Workshop,
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enter the phrase before each use of PGP, both to encrypt and to
decrypt. To further complicate the process, PGP makes its operations unpredictable by the use of human-generated random numbers."' This process ensures that a brute-force attempt at discovering the pass phrase can take literally hundreds of millions
of years.
Until some other "backdoor" method emerges, decryption of a
PGP-encrypted document requires the user to reveal the pass
phrase, incriminating herself in the process in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. The second Doe decision seized on this difference, maintaining that the entire Schmerber line of cases barred
a suspect from "being compelled to disclose or communicate information or facts that might serve as or lead to incriminating evidence.""' Being forced to reveal a pass phrase might serve as,
or lead to, incriminating evidence.
It also would testify to the user's possession of the encrypted
files, for only the actual user would know the correct pass
phrase. The instructions for using PGP, as with any form of software privacy protection, urge the user to keep the passwords
secret, neither to share them with friends nor to write them
down."' Therefore, it appears that PGP users remain safe from
compulsory revelation of their pass phrases; as such, their documents are probably safe from law enforcement decryption."'

http:J/www.efh.org/pgp/pgpwork.html#passphrasesize.
'12Id. Specifically, PGP asks the user to type for a few seconds. It uses the frequency
of the keystrokes to generate the random numbers. So long as the individual does not use
the auto-repeat feature on the keyboard, truly random numbers will be produced. An
encryption process called IDEA facilitates the conversion. Id.
13 487 US at 211 n 10.
Jeff Licquia, Alt.security.pgp FAQ § 3.12. (How do I remember my pass phrase?),
http'//www.quadralay.com/www/Crypt/PGP/pgp0O.html. His answer:
This can be quite a problem especially if you are like me and have about a dozen
different pass phrases that are required in your everyday life. Writing them
down someplace so that you can remember them would defeat the whole purpose of pass phrases in the first place. There is really no good way around this.
Either remember it, or write it down someplace and risk having it compromised.
Id.
115

There is still the prospect of governmentally granted immunity in certain cases if it

deems the information vital enough. In national security cases, for example, the contents
of the information may be the most vital interest for the government. See Phillip
Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U Chi Legal F 171.
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CONCLUSION

If the government seeks to force a solution to the problem
cryptography poses to law enforcement, it will violate the First
and Fifth Amendments as currently understood. All potential
gains to law enforcement are offset by the destruction of true
privacy and individual rights in cyberspace. FBI Director Louis
Freeh has testified that encryption is posing an increasing roadblock for investigations of espionage cases, child pornographers,
drug traffickers, and militia groups."'
The issue rests on trust: if one fears narcoterrorists and
espionage agents, not to mention mundane criminals like the
Mafia, then some means of assisting law enforcement officials in
their tasks needs to exist. Were this an issue of policy, fertile
grounds for debate would exist here. One could engage in all
sorts of balancing tests to determine whether the interests of
cryptography users outweighed those of the state. However few
and rare, cases exist in which most of us would believe that the
government should have access to encrypted documents. For
example, if the government believes that the export of sensitive
nuclear secrets to enemies of the state breaches national security,
then it should have the ability to intervene.
But if the government knows that people are distributing
classified documents, then it already has sufficient information to
intervene. Because encrypted documents do not disclose their
own contents, government suspicion about a communication
means that it already possesses extrinsic incriminating evidence." 7 Indeed, these crimes cannot take place solely in the
encrypted world: real-life actions such as theft or distribution of
illegal goods must occur as well for harm to arise. These tangible
harms can still be prosecuted.
Cryptography does alter the equation for law enforcement,
but these new dangers cannot force an overturning of our rights

"s.

Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act of 1996,

Hearings on S 1726 before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong, 2d Sess (July 25, 1996) (testimony of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation).
17 According to William R. Spernow, a computer crime specialist who has worked
with the Federal Bureau of Justice Assistance on several encryption-related cases, including one in which a pedophile encrypted the identities of his young victims, "'In cases
where there's encryption, the officers have been able to make the case through other
investigative means .... If we hustle, we can still make our cases through other kinds of
police work.'" Steven Levy, The Cypherpunks vs. Uncle Sam, New York Times Magazine
46, 49 (June 12, 1994) (cited in note 18).
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under the Constitution. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v
United States is as true today as it was in 1928: "Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."'' 8

"'. 277 US 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis dissenting).

